Topic > Social justice and rights interfere with natural ones...

As part of his “Rights Theory of Justice”, Robert Nozick argues that structured principles of distributive justice are ultimately unjust because they interfere with individuals' natural rights . A principle of distributive justice is “modeled” if it “specifies that a distribution must vary along with some natural size, weighted sum of natural sizes, or lexicographic ordering of natural sizes,” he explains. Thus, a principle that distributes goods in society to individuals based on need, utility to society, intelligence, or some combination of these is modeled according to Nozick's definition. In Nozick's libertarian vision, “the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified [morally]” without violating the rights of individuals. It does not specify what constitutes a “minimal” state, but suggests that it is one that fully supports the liberal ideal of self-ownership, fully respectful of individuals' freedoms of choice and action (to the extent that they do not interfere with others), and never limits the freedom of such persons without their voluntary consent. However, for Nozick, “structured principles of justice require redistributed activities” and “the probability is small that any actually freely obtained set of possessions will fit a given model.” take into account the assets to which people are entitled, respecting four fundamental restrictions: I. He who acquires a share in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to such participation.II. Whoever acquires a company according to the principle of justice in the transfer, from another owner of the company, has the right to the company....... half of the document... possible moral duties and obligations. Taxing a person a few cents certainly does not mean forcing them to work at gunpoint. An analogy is only as strong as its two cases are similar, but the degree of harm resulting from taxation and slavery is too dissimilar to be considered reasonably analogous. If a hungry person were to take $10 for food from multibillionaire Mark Zuckerberg's piggy bank, it would be difficult to pinpoint any harm done to Zuckerberg beyond the violation of his free choice. On the other hand, it seems that Zuckerberg not giving $10 to the hungry person is a detriment when Zuckerberg could have very easily done so. Given that the latter option seems more intuitive than the former, perhaps it is true that other moral obligations can trump uninhibited freedom, thus allowing for some limited forms of taxation that still broadly recognize people's rights.