The quotation from Kant in his “Critique of Pure Reason” is given by way of explanation; explaining exactly why previous forms of metaphysics have failed to transform into a natural science to this extent. The quote is the very essence of Kant's argument for the Copernican revolution of metaphysics. Kant will go on to explain exactly why this form could be a science, but at this point in the work, Kant is still explaining to the reader how reason has arrived beyond metaphysics, “so far it has not had the good fortune to enter the safe path of science, although it is older than all other sciences and would remain even if all the others were swallowed up in the abyss of barbarism that destroys everything." (P. 98, B xiii) The terms Kant uses in the quote are easily as important as the entire quote taken together. Kant has a very specific understanding of most of the words demonstrated in his works. I will therefore begin by defining some words in terms of Kant's use of them. The “experiment” to which Kant refers is simply the question of whether metaphysics as it has been known by seeking to grasp things in themselves, or metaphysics as Kant develops it, will achieve more towards the ends of reason. An “object” is anything in the bodily world that we can experience through our mode of cognition. As a finite being, one's knowledge has limits, a boundary of experience, and as such we cannot have experiences outside the corporeal world in space and time. Our experience of objects arises from their use through the structure of our mode of cognition, through sensitive intuition. In essence, we experience an object of the corporeal world through sensations and from this we come to understand its properties. “Metaphysics” i...... middle of the paper ...... alive and determined by our mode of cognition. The quote from Kant's “Critique of Pure Reason” proceeds from four premises: that it has previously been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects, that everything metaphysics has tried to do by means of concepts has not worked until at that moment, that we would be better able to solve the problem of metaphysics by supposing that objects must conform to our way of knowing, and that metaphysics requires a priori knowledge to make sense of what is given to us by experience. A number of implications flow from this argument, most of which involve shifting notions of concepts. Overall, Kant effectively outlines his Copernican revolution in this quote. Works Cited Kant, I. (1998). Critique of pure reason. In L. Beck (ed.), The Great Philosophers; Kantian selections (pp. 85-144). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc.