Like Kaposy, Peter faces a debate between a few different sources. Seipel introduces us to Charles C. Camosy, professor of ethics and theology and author of numerous articles for the journal Bioethics. Seipel quotes Camosy as saying: “… a fetus is not an 'actualized person' in the sense of having 'the actual capacities to become a person', i.e. 'rationality and self-awareness over time.' Nonetheless,…fetuses have moral standing as persons because they are what he calls “potential persons.” What are potential persons?… beings who have the potential to be rational and self-conscious” (518). Seipel and Camosy are absolutely right. Given that a fetus is a “potential person,” it is equally valuable and morally unjustifiable to kill a comatose individual (who also has the potential to be rational and self-aware, but is also not within his current capabilities). state). Seipel then presents us with the point of view of Jeff McMahan, professor of moral philosophy at the University of Oxford who has produced numerous works on the issue of abortion. McMahan assumes that the right to life depends on the “psychological continuity” of the individual. To refute this idea, Seipel proposes: “Alzheimer's victims lack such continuity. Therefore, the implication is that, just like the death of a fetus, it is not all that tragic,