Despite numerous studies investigating dishonest behavior, ecological validity in moral decision-making research is lacking. Many studies have used instructed lying paradigms and consequently the lying observed in these studies is different from more spontaneous forms of lying in that it does not involve a voluntary intention to lie. Furthermore, participants are not as motivated to behave dishonestly in instructed lying experiments compared to real-world situations, where dishonesty is more of an impulsive and context-dependent act (Giorgio Ganis & Keenan, 2009). In the absence of voluntary intention and motivation, the complex executive functions associated with dishonesty may not be fully investigated (Sip, Roepstorff, McGregor, & Frith, 2008). Subsequently, studies using instructed lying paradigms have examined cognitive conflict related to deception; inhibit the truth to produce lies, but not moral ones; choosing self-interest and therefore sacrificing honesty (Panasiti et al., 2014). As a result, studies began to compare different types of lies and found that the neural regions and processes involved depend on the type of lie. Regions such as the ACC, precentral gyrus, and cuneus appear to be involved in spontaneous lying. In contrast, lies with memorized scenarios recruit only the right anterior middle frontal gyrus ( Giorgi Ganis et al., 2003 ). Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay. Similarly, Yin, et al. (2016) found that in addition to the patterns shared with instructed lying, there are some activation patterns sensitive to spontaneous deception. In this regard, simulated dishonesty in laboratory experiments cannot be considered the same as dishonesty in real-world situations. In this regard, more recent studies have created new paradigms to study the neural mechanisms of dishonesty in a more natural way. In these new paradigms, participants are tempted to behave dishonestly in exchange for monetary rewards (N. Abe & Greene, 2014; Baumgartner et al., 2009, 2013; Bhatt, Lohrenz, Camerer, & Montague, 2010; Greene & Paxton, 2009 Sip et al., 2010, 2012; D. Sun, Lee, & Chan, 2015; advantage of these paradigms is that participants themselves decide whether to behave unethically or not, which also captures moral conflict. However, the results of these studies are mixed and further research is needed. At the same time, when examining research on moral decision making, an important distinction should be made between deception and cheating behavior. Deceptive behavior requires an interaction partner direct and occurs in a social context (Zuckerman, Depaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). It also requires a thoughtful decision to deceive the interaction partner. In contrast, cheating behavior does not require direct interaction with the partner and is therefore less interactive and less social. Since there is a difference between the concepts of deception and cheating behavior, the underlying neural mechanisms involved may also be different. So far, most neuroimaging research has focused on deception, and almost no research has been conducted on cheating behavior. This is surprising, because more costly forms of dishonest behavior, such as tax avoidance, are labeled as fraud rather than deception. Because the constructs of deception and cheating share neural processes, deception research can be used for insights into cheating, however, the less interactive form of dishonest behavior should..