IndexIntroductionThe pre-war era and the beginning of German military culturePost-war German military culture: rearmamentPostunification and the dawn of a new eraConclusionIntroductionGermany was the stage on which they occurred many seismic events events that occurred in the 20th and 21st centuries. From World War I and World War II to the Cold War and the modern era, the German people have experienced their fair share of seismic shifts in culture and identity. Likewise, the culture of the German armed forces has changed in each subsequent era. From Hitler's Wehrmacht to demilitarization, remilitarization of East Germany and West Germany, and then unification, each version of the German military has had its own distinct culture, ethos, and history, tied to historical context and political climate of Germany at that time. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay This article will explore changes in the culture of the German Armed Forces after the War of German Unification and answer how the German Army transitioned from an imperial power to a defensive force and is now regaining an expeditionary character. According to Austin Long in “Culture, Doctrine and Military Professionalization,” organizational culture is defined as “a shared set of beliefs about the organization and mission” (Long 15) . He argues that these beliefs shape the response of organizations and its members to their environment, to the challenges, opportunities, and constraints related to their environment and their mission. Additionally, culture serves as a filter for information received by an individual or organization, allowing them to process information more quickly. This is much more pronounced in the professional army of various countries. Because an army must quickly process a large amount of information and intelligence to decide the next attack, counterattack, or retreat, how this information is filtered and how a response is generated can be considered a function of that army's culture. army. The World War Era and the Beginning of German Military CultureLong explores the development of military culture and argues that a military man's culture begins with his "first war" (Long 25). Long describes a nation's “first war” as “the great conflict which the organization takes as a model for the development of vocational education, and takes place in the period preceding and during the establishment of the vocational school…” (Long 25) . In the case of Germany, Long considers the wars of German unification to be the “first war” of the Prussian/German army (Long 25). The wars of German unification led to the creation of an officer corps in which uneducated aristocrats dominated over educated officers (Long 25). These two blocs fighting for power and the right to develop German culture and military doctrine continued to struggle against each other until the end of the 19th century, when Helmuth von Moltke became field marshal of the German army (Long 25 ). Molke, who was an aristocrat in favor of education, drew lessons from the wars of unification to build the concepts and organizational culture of the German army. Cultural elements ingrained in the German military psyche were the need “for a mass mobilization army led by technocratic officer corps, the utility of directive command rather than detailed orders, and the importance of rapid maneuvers to achieve decisive battles of encirclement and annihilation." "(Long 25). These militarily important cultural precepts could be seenin subsequent German operations. For example, the idea of ​​rapid maneuver was the foundation of the hugely successful Blitzkrieg (Long 25). Isabel V. Hull argues in "National Politics and Military Culture" that the German Army's unique position in the German constitution was the most important factor in shaping its culture at the time (Hull 103). Hull argues that this unique position arose because of the German military's primary task of protecting the monarchy from internal dissent instead of protecting the nation (Hull 103). The German military's relationship with the monarch was cemented when Prussian War Minister Albrecht von Roon pressured the monarch to nominate the military candidate for chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (Hull 103). Bismarck then used the army to unify Germany through bloodshed. The army's unification of Germany gave the military institution and Bismarck an air of credibility and heroism, thus allowing Bismarck to craft a constitution that solidly placed military subordination to the monarch. Therefore, unlike many Western armies today, the German army was not an instrument of the civilian government nor was it accountable to it. The Reichstag had limited budgetary powers over the armed forces, and the Prussian War Minister was generally kept out of the loop on military affairs (Hull 104). At the same time, relations between the monarchy and the army continued to prosper. High-ranking military officers gained the right to meet with the monarch in the chancellor's absence, thus allowing military policy and doctrine to develop without civilian control (hull 104). The adoration of the military in Germany and the belief that the German Armed Forces could promote German ambitions abroad by fueling the rise of agitation societies such as the Pan-German League, the Naval League and the Army League (hull 107) . These groups sought to pressure the government to use military force to promote an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, which they believed befitted Germany's position as a world power. The activities of these groups further increased the significance of the army to German national identity, and it soon became impossible to separate the army as a symbol of national identity from the actions of the institution itself (Hull 108). According to Hull, the symbolic nature of the military had serious effects on military culture. She argues that the two most serious effects were the stereotyping of the military and the need for the military to succeed at all costs (Hull 108). The army was associated with great values ​​such as courage, strength, patriotism, brotherhood, etc., which could be seen in the media of the time. This literature had serious effects on the young men who would join the army in search of those values. Likewise, the belief that the army could not fail was so strong and widespread that, once Germany lost World War I, many Germans did not see it as a defeat due to enemy superiority or military mistakes. army, but as a result of being “stabbed in the back at home” by the political class (Hull 109). As is well documented in history, this disenchantment with the political class on the part of the German people and military allowed the rise of Hitler and Nazism. Postwar German Military Culture: Rearmament Germany's crushing defeat by the Allies in 1945 was a low point not only for the German army, but for the German people in general. The price to be paid to the German economy was enormous due to the severe shortage of basic goods and millions of people were killed, imprisoned or deportedin the Soviet Union as workers. Germany also lost its sovereignty, with its territory divided into four occupation zones by the victors. This would ultimately lead to the creation of East and West Germany. The Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945 decided on the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, so that an aggressive, militaristic German state would never again rise up and threaten Europe (Nielsen 24). Thus, within a year, the proud military culture and organization that had developed since the nineteenth century dissolved into thin air. In West Germany, the Allies undertook a massive task to inculcate pro-Western attitudes and anti-militarist precepts into the German people through schools, the written press, churches, etc. (Nielsen 24). The Nuremberg Trials were widely broadcast and the leaders of the armed forces were publicly indicted. The total defeat of the German army, which had been the main institution embodying the spirit and culture of Germany, led to intense soul-searching on the part of the political class for the next two decades (Niesen 25). Groups across the political spectrum have come to different conclusions about why Germany was defeated. Left-wing groups began to support the war cry “never war again” which influenced their decisions and policies towards rearmament. On the right, the idea of ​​“never alone again” emerged (Nielsen 25). The right saw the need to integrate Germany and German culture with the West, thus ensuring Germany's security from future threats. The clashes between these two groups led to a new military and strategic culture for the future Bundeswehr, which sought to “seek partnership and cooperation, emphasis on building trust between Germany and its partners and neighbors, a defense posture that avoided offensive strategies and general security and military restraint” (Nielsen 26). This new culture contrasted sharply with the culture of the Prussian Army and Wehrmacht, which emphasized rapid and decisive offensive strategies and which did not place much faith in the Allies' capabilities due to the belief in German military superiority. Furthermore, the attitudes of the “never war again” and “never alone again” groups differed significantly from the ideas and ambitions of the nineteenth-century Naval Society, Army Society, and Pan-German League, which sought aggressive German intervention in 'abroad. As stated previously, the idea of ​​German rearmament was controversial within Germany due to fears of a repeat of 1945. It was also extremely controversial for Germany's neighbors, who had suffered from past German territorial ambitions and feared future German aggression. So when Germany asked for admission to NATO, other European countries resisted. Konrad Adenauer, who was elected chancellor of Germany's first post-war government, saw rearmament and admission into NATO as central to his goal of integration with the West. He also realized that West Germany would have to allay the fears of its neighbors in light of recent history (Nielson 26). The shift in geopolitical calculations ultimately allowed West Germany to overcome opposition to its admission to NATO as the West began to focus on the growing threat of the Soviet Union and a communist China. In 1954, nine years after the end of World War II, Germany was invited to join NATO and begin the rearmament process. So Adenauer began the onerous task of rebuilding an army that posed no threat to Germany's neighbors or to German democracy. (Nielsen 29). Nielsen describes it as Adenauerhe summoned the founding fathers of the Bundeswehr, a group of former Wehrmacht officers, to Himmerod Abbey in the Eifel Mountains and tasked them with building a democratic and defensive army (Nielsen 29). To reassure critics at home and abroad, the German military has placed many guarantees on its operation. It relied on NATO for critical command and control assets in addition to the deterrence provided by the nuclear weapons of other NATO members (Nielsen 29). The military chain of command structure was weakened, and the highest ranking officers in the Army, Navy, and Air Force all reported directly to the civilian Minister of Defense (Nielsen 29). The highest-ranking military member of the Bundeswehr, notably called inspector general instead of “commander,” had no command authority (Nielsen 29). All German forces in active service were subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Furthermore, Germany has given up any intention to develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or to build long-range strategic bombers or large warships (Nielsen29). Therefore, the army was forced to take any aggressive action and was strictly subordinated and accountable to the civilian government and Western powers. Furthermore, the character of the ideal soldier has changed. While the values ​​of manliness, courage, and bravado were emphasized and revered within the Prussian and Nazi armies, the concept of “well-informed, well-educated citizen soldiers” was emphasized in the ranks of new German soldiers (Nielsen 30). The education and indoctrination of soldiers emphasized the Bundeswehr's subordination to civilian government. These programs “aimed to create politically informed soldiers, capable of distinguishing between legitimate and criminal orders, between democracy and repression” (Nielson 30), thus hopefully preventing a repeat of the wartime atrocities of World War II. Thus, the newly founded Bundeswehr had a significantly different culture and purpose than its predecessors. Within the new German armed forces, “ethics had been civilized, the civil rights of soldiers guaranteed to an extent unparalleled in German history, the social diversity of the officer corps had increased, and the variety of political attitudes and loyalties within the military expanded” (Nielson 30). The introduction of conscription in 1956 ensured that the army would benefit from a wide variety of opinions, cultures and voices within it. After Unification and the Dawn of a New Era After rearmament, there was one topic that politicians across the spectrum agreed on, and that was that Germany would not deploy its troops outside Europe to participate in interventions (Nielsen 39). In this way, Germany distanced itself from the proxy wars that occurred during the Cold War. When the United States asked Germany to provide assistance in Vietnam, Germany politely refused stating that the newly formed Bundeswehr was not ready to fight abroad (Nielsen 39). Likewise, when West Germany joined the United Nations in 1973, it refused to participate in UN peacekeeping missions (Nielsen 39). This reluctance to participate in combat operations outside of Europe can be seen as a direct result of the post-war perception and culture of the German military. First, many in the political class pointed to a supposed constitutional ban against deploying troops outside Europe (Niesen 39). The German political class, especially on the left, also believed that, in light of recent history, Germany had no right to intervene abroad (Niesen 39). The right was.