Topic > Analyzing Epistemological Theories to Determine Individuals' Beliefs About Knowledge

Numerous researchers in the field have sought to understand how children, adolescents, and adults come to understand what it means to know. The five most famous epistemological theories focused on determining individual beliefs about knowledge. Notably, these theories have many similarities and differences. Therefore, the epistemological theories of development that will be further discussed include: 1) “Perry's Intellectual and Ethical Development Scheme”; 2) “Model of epistemological reflection” by Baxter Magolda (1986; 1992); 3) Kitchener and King's (1981) "reflective judgments" model. ; 4) “Women's Ways of Knowing” model by Belenky and colleagues (1986); and 5) Kuhn and colleagues' (1991; 2000) “Argumentative Reasoning Model.” We say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Initially, research on epistemology was primarily focused on adults, so Perry (1970) delves into research on epistemological development, studying how adults (e.g., college students) understood knowledge. His theory was based on determining how young adults (i.e., college students) reason at different epistemological levels. Perry (1970) tested 313 college students about their experiences during their first year of college study. The researchers also interviewed 31 of these students throughout their college careers to determine the significance of their college experiences. Based on the interview results, Perry (1970) created nine transitional positions that arose in college and tested these phases in a second study with 109 participants. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) summarized Perry's (1970) nine positions (i.e. epistemological levels), which were grouped into 4 main categories, which included: 1) dualism (i.e. an absolutist view of knowledge); 2) multiplicity (i.e. the transition period from dualism to relativism); 3) relativism (i.e. the complete transition from being dualist to evaluativist); and 4) commitment within relativism (i.e. an extension of relativism). More specifically, dualism was based on the idea that there was always an objective right or wrong answer, representing one's knowledge as certain and absolute. On the other hand, when moving to multiplicity, the individual realizes that uncertainty is present in knowledge and no absolute truth is present, which ultimately allows for subjective and divergent opinions between individuals. Finally, relativism and engagement within relativism were defined as individuals seeing themselves as active agents in the construction of meaning, as the individual began to analyze and recognize that knowledge was “relative, contingent, and contextual.” This level of epistemological development brought out different perspectives, where the individual had to decide based on what he had learned whether there was a more truthful judgment than another. Accordingly, Perry's (1970) research demonstrated that college students explained their experiences on the basis of these nine epistemological positions (i.e., epistemological levels), regarding the developmental changes they experienced (i.e., moving from a dualist to a multiplier and from a multiplier to a relativist) as opposed to changes in one's personality. Thereafter, Perry's (1970) theory of epistemological development did not create a connection between epistemology and education, however, it did allow for the postulation that once students moved from dualism to relativism, therewould have been changes in the learning and studying methods of students around the world. their education. Furthermore, Baxter Magolda (1986; 1992) also wanted to advance Perry's (1970) work by studying epistemological development in relation to education (as cited in Hofer and Pintrich, 1997). Specifically, Baxter Magolda (1986; 1992) and colleagues studied 101 participants over 5 years, using open-ended interviews, in order to determine the changes they experienced in their understanding of knowledge. Specifically, Baxter Magolda's (1986; 1992) “epistemological reflection model” included 4 types of knowledge. First, “absolute knowledge” (i.e., based on dualism), was defined as individuals passively receiving knowledge and believing that authority figures are omniscient. Second, “transient knowledge” (i.e., multiplicity-based), involved individuals realizing that authority figures did not know all the answers, which brought uncertainty and subjectivity into knowledge, as individuals were now understood to have different points of view. Third, “independent knowledge” consisted of individuals having their own opinions, as they had become active agents of their own learning. Finally, “contextual knowledge” (i.e. based on relativism), referred to evaluating knowledge and being a critical thinker by accepting that knowledge is constantly evolving. These types of knowledge were similar to Perry's (1970) epistemological positions, however the focus was on gender-related epistemological development. Similarly, Kitchener and King (1981) also advanced Perry's (1970) work by creating their “reflective judgment model” (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). The researchers tested the participants through interviews, in order to determine their judgments on certain issues. Specifically, their theory consisted of a seven-stage model, which included the pre-reflective, quasi-reflective, and reflective stage. In particular, in the pre-reflective stages, the notion of understanding was that individuals saw the world in absolute terms, as is the case for most young children, because they think there is only one right or wrong answer. Once children enter adolescence, their understanding of knowledge becomes almost reflexive. At this stage, adolescents have a multiplist view of knowledge, as they began to realize that uncertainty was present, as individuals can have different opinions and both be correct. Finally, in adulthood, the transition from the quasi-reflexive to the fully reflective stage occurred. In the final stages of the model, adults understood that knowledge was based on the evaluavist level, as individuals acquired critical thinking and were able to determine whether one statement was stronger than another, based on supporting evidence of the statement (Kitchener & Re, 1981). Henceforth, this model corresponds similarly to Perry's (1970) model of nine positions of understanding knowledge. However, Kitchener and King (1981) point out that an individual's knowledge does not fit neatly into the individual's educational learning, regarding the fact that higher stages of reflective judgments were more common than lower stages. Notably, these higher stages of reflective judgments (i.e., quasi-reflective and reflective stages) were associated with higher education, as opposed to lower stages. Ultimately, this sheds light on different levels of epistemological understanding and association with learning in education. In contrast to whatabove, Belenky and colleagues (1986) attacked Perry's (1970) work on epistemological development, as they felt there was a lack of research on women's epistemological development within Perry's framework (as cited in Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). More specifically, Belenky and colleagues' (1986) theory of “women's ways of knowing” focused on women's interpretations of the world in order to further understand their epistemological development. Specifically, they studied 135 women using semi-structured interviews, in order to gain insight into the perspectives of women around the world. Based on the interviews, Belenky and colleagues (1986) presented their version of Perry's nine positions (so-called epistemological perspectives) which included: 1) “Silence,” which was based on passive listening and acquiring knowledge; 2) “Received knowledge” (i.e. dualism), where the interpretation was that there was always a right or wrong answer; 3) “Subjective knowledge” (i.e. multiplicity), where the individual recognizes that other people may have different subjective opinions and both may be correct; 4) “Procedural knowledge,” which was based on “separate knowledge” (i.e., the use of critical and analytical thinking in reasoning, which was similar to the evaluativist position) and “connected knowledge” (i.e., the use of empathy and care in reasoning; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, page 95); and 5) “Constructed Knowledge,” which relied on the amalgamation of subjective and objective knowledge during reasoning. Therefore, Belenky and colleagues' (1986) research has furthered the field by incorporating women's epistemological development, which is similar to Perry's theory, however with the added component of empathy and caring. Finally, the most common theory of epistemological development in this field today centers on Kuhn's (1991) model, known as the “argumentative reasoning” model. Kuhn (1991) was interested in everyday argumentative reasoning and how individuals understand and reason about knowledge. Specifically, Kuhn (1991) studied 40 participants using interviews, in order to determine individuals' beliefs about common social issues (e.g., prisoners returning to crime, academic failure, jury duty, etc.). Notably, based on this study, Kuhn (1991) was able to determine that participants' responses were similar to her predecessor's research regarding epistemological levels of understanding, which Kuhn (1991) now labeled “absolutist, multiplier and evaluativist”. In this sense, Kuhn and Park (2005) defined epistemological understanding based on the individual's ability to manage subjective and objective knowledge. This linked epistemological development with children's theory of mind research. Therefore, in early childhood (i.e. preschool age) children receive knowledge from external factors, ultimately placing them at the realistic level of epistemological understanding. At this age, children were confident in their beliefs, which they passively acquired, and had no hesitation in their beliefs, as realists believed that everyone perceived the same information, ultimately making them copies of the same external world (Kuhn & Park , 2005). However, by age 4, children were beginning to understand that individuals had internal mental states, which were not inevitably copied. This kindling of the understanding that the self was incorporated into the equation when thinking about knowledge led to theory of mind research. Specifically, Astington (1991) and Wellman (1990) argued that a child developed a theory of mind if he or she was able to “(a)understand[ing] that others have mental states such as knowledge andintentions and (b) predict[ing] and explain[ing] behavior consistently by attributing these mental states to oneself and/or another.” Children usually had a general idea of ​​theory of mind by age 3. However, to fully develop theory of mind, children must first be able to understand what it means to know. Specifically, children can only claim to know if they are able to distinguish the truthfulness of a statement, differentiating a true statement from a false one (i.e., being able to successfully complete false belief tasks). These children also had to be certain in their judgments about statements, where they had no hesitation, which resulted in speculation (i.e., which is a lack of knowledge). The false belief tasks, which assessed theory of mind, aimed to determine how young children understood that other people had minds and that the contents of their minds were different from the contents of their own minds. For example, Keil (2014) explained the classic Sally-Anne task, in which Sally put her toy in the basket and then left the room; Anne then moves Sally's toy from the basket to the box and leaves the room too; when Sally returns she will look in the basket (i.e., that it was a false belief). In order to complete this false belief task, the child must understand that Sally had a wrong belief (i.e., she thought the toy was in the bin, where she left it), which is different from children's right response (i.e. knowing that Anne has moved the toy from the bin to the box). Thus, with respect to age-related theory of mind understanding, at age 4, children successfully completed false belief tasks and were able to distinguish statements of certainty from statements of uncertainty. Specifically, by age 4, children understood what it meant to know, and by age 5, children correctly completed complex false belief tasks because they are able to understand that individuals may have different access to information. Although it is crucial to note that in this classic false belief task, children did not understand theory of mind before the age of 4 or 5, however concurrent research has shown that with a simpler task, the child as early as 2 years of age age could understand the basics. theory of mind (Keil, 2014). Therefore, once the children completed the false belief task, they understood that individuals have minds and that the contents of the mind vary from person to person, giving rise to the idea that a person can have the right answer and another person may have the wrong answer. Thus, theory of mind in children was a springboard for subsequent epistemological development. At this point, realists become absolutists in their epistemological understanding, where children believe that facts (i.e., having the right or wrong answer) represent reality (Kuhn et al., 2000). Therefore, even absolutists were certain in their beliefs, as they did not think that experts could be wrong, because they believed that there was only one right or wrong answer, centered on objectivity. Ultimately, in terms of age-related changes, children were absolutists from age 4 or 5 until late childhood. Then, the absolutist transformed into a multiplier during adolescence (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Specifically, at the multiplist level of epistemological understanding, the adolescent has incorporated subjectivity into his or her beliefs, as beliefs of fact are transformed into beliefs of opinion. Therefore, at this level, adolescents have understood that.