Since the publication of the Discourse on Method, Renes Descartes seems to have become the poster child for the position of mind/body dualism. Throughout the Discourse and in his subsequent works, Descartes postulates several arguments in favor of the absolute distinction and, therefore, separateness of mind and body. The position is not simply that mind and body have different properties, but that they are entirely different substances. In this essay I aim to outline Descartes' main arguments and evaluate their strength with reference to modern critical approaches. It sometimes seems, however, that these modern responses cloud the air around the arguments presented by Descartes himself; charitable interpretations, although they may generate more acceptable statements, are often useless when discussing the validity and soundness of the arguments that Descartes himself puts into words. Ultimately, I will try to support the line of argument that, although the work of Descartes' critics has brought out hidden premises thus making his arguments valid, many of his premises are still full of flaws. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay I would like to begin by addressing two arguments for mind-body separation that arise from the difference in properties between the two entities. First, I will discuss the famous argument from doubt which, as Hooker points out, is often regarded as "his main argument for the distinction of himself and his body[1]". The argument follows from the cogito conclusion; the meditator cannot doubt his own existence since his existence is evident from his thinking at that moment; the fact that he is thinking is evident from his doubts. Descartes notes that "from this I recognized that I was a substance whose entire essence and nature is conscious being and whose being requires no place and does not depend on any material thing." The skeptic cannot doubt that he exists, but contemplating his body, he is unable to rely on its reality (it could be an illusion, for example). It is clear, therefore, that the mind and body must be distinct since they are not. both have the property of indubitability. Formally, Descartes holds that (1) I can doubt that my body exists (2) I cannot doubt that I exist (3) therefore I am not identical to my body. The topic seems suspicious. First, the argument presented is not a formally valid logical proof; the premises do not naturally lead to the conclusion without the addition of another premise. Descartes does not add this premise but later commentators tend to accept its implicitness. It seems that Descartes presupposes Leibniz's law, the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals: "for all things x and y, if x is identical to y, then for all properties p, x has p if, and only if, y" has p [2].' Acceptance of the validity of the argument from doubt, then, is based on acceptance of this principle. Descartes, although implicitly basing himself on it, does not provide arguments in its favour. Fortunately, the indiscernibility of identicals is commonly accepted among philosophers, although objections have been raised. Hooker reminds us, for example, of Kenny's belief in the limits of Leibniz's law; the law, he argues, cannot be used in “modal and intentional contexts”.[3] According to Kenny, Descartes implicitly relies on law in such a context and is consequently guilty of “needing a principle not applicable to his premises; or, as some would say, a false principle[4]'. Many would disagree with Kenny's objection and accept Leibniz's law as a necessary and unlimited truth ofnumerically identical things. However, the fact that this can be doubted weakens Descartes' thesis since, firstly, he neither defends Leibniz's law nor even recognizes its use (Descartes would not have defended a law called "Leibniz's law" since it does not had yet been adopted).been formulated, but did not defend his use of the principle that today we would call Leibniz's law), thus leaving him open to this type of criticism. Second, even if Descartes relies implicitly on Leibniz's law, he is not in a position to do so; it has just concluded its existence and is in no position to assert general laws about the identity of objects whose existence it has not yet demonstrated. Hooker points out another problem with the argument from doubt; Descartes argues from his doubting that his body exists and from not doubting that it exists to the 'de re equivalents[5]' of these assertions: his body has the property of being doubted by him and he as a thinking thing does not. This kind of move could lead to a farcical inference like Hooker's example of Tom and his father: "I can doubt whether John ever fathered a son, so John has the property of being probably doubted by me that he has never fathered a child." I cannot doubt that Tom's father ever had a son, so Tom's father does not have the property of being doubted by me that he ever had a son. Since John owns property not owned by Tom's father, the two are distinct[6].' The argument is obviously fallacious. Arnauld expresses a similar concern in the fourth set of objections; simply because one may doubt whether an object has a property does not mean that it does not have that property. He uses the example of a right triangle arguing that one might well doubt whether it has the Pythagorean property but this does not mean that the triangle does not possess it since it is a necessary part of a right triangle. triangle. Distinguishing the triangle from this feature is impossible. Likewise, “despite my ability to imagine myself without a body, the body is indeed an essential part of me, something without which I could not exist[7].” It seems that the property of being doubted by the meditator is not a genuine property of an object, it is a fact about the meditator. Descartes attempts to address Arnauld's concern in his responses. He argues that "...we cannot have a clear understanding of a triangle having the square on the hypotenuse equal to the squares on the other sides without being at the same time aware that it is a rectangle." Yet we can clearly and distinctly perceive the mind without the body and the body without the mind[8]'. However, we know this fact about triangles. It is mathematically impossible that this is not the case. In the case of mind and body, we begin our investigations from a place of ignorance; although we can conceive of the two as distinct, they could just as easily be inseparable without our knowledge. As Hatfield says, "it is possible that the thinking self and the body are actually identical, and the reasoner ignores this fact[9]. Descartes subsequently attempts to escape the claim that he draws his conclusion from ignorance by denying that the passages of discourse that suggest this were not intended to be his conclusion (although it appears that they were: "by this I knew that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is merely to think, and that it does not... .depend on any material thing[10] ...') Descartes is sending confusing and conflicting messages here. In any case, in any case, Descartes seems to admit that the argument from doubt, as stated in the Discourse, fails. It can be made valid but remains unfounded. Next, I would like to address the topic of divisibility.The argument simply states that the mind and body are separate entities; the former is indivisible and the latter divisible. Descartes claims that '...when I consider the mind, or myself as merely a thinking thing, I cannot distinguish any part within myself; I consider myself something absolutely unique and complete. Even though the whole mind appears to be united with the whole body, I recognize that if a foot, an arm, or any other part of the body is cut off, nothing is taken away from the mind. Again, for validity purposes, it must come into play Leibniz's law. The mind and body are distinct because they do not possess the same attributes i.e. indivisibility. Perhaps the most obvious problem here is that Descartes' conception of the mind does not seem to mesh well with medical observations about the mind. Brain damage has been shown to affect our mind and decrease our mental capacity. Cottingham is very matter-of-fact on this particular point; he argues that there is abundant evidence that mental capacity is diminished by damage to the nervous system, for example, "and the depressingly likely inference from this must be that total destruction of the central nervous system will cause total mental extinction[11]. ' He also recognizes how common it is for the mind to seemingly exist in tension with itself, that is, for there to be almost two wills in the mind. Consciousness is, therefore, not necessarily a unitary thing. Even if it were a unified thing, it could still rely on the brain physical which, as Descartes accepts, can be divided. Descartes' argument within the Meditations, often called "the argument from clear and distinct perception", seems much less susceptible to obvious errors than those arguments arising from distinct properties. of mind and body, although the errors are still present. The argument once again emphasizes that the meditator is absolutely sure that he is a thinking thing and has a clear enough understanding of what thinking is to allow him to accept the possibility that he may not. to be an extended thing. Likewise, the meditator has a clear understanding of the body as an extended and non-thinking thing; it is essential to its being that it be extended, but it is not necessary that it be a thinking thing. If the meditator can conceive of a thinking thing that is not extended and an extended thing that does not think, then it is possible for God to create a world in which these clearly understood possibilities are actually realities. If God could truly create a thinking, non-extended thing and vice versa, then they must be distinct and separately existing things. First, many have recognized the problem of Descartes apparently stating that because he can clearly and distinctly perceive mind and body as existing apart, they can actually be distinct. Enter Arnauld, once again, with his triangle. He argues that one could clearly and distinctly perceive the existence of a right-angled triangle without possessing the Pythagorean property and Descartes seems to suggest that this makes the object and the principle distinct. Evidently they are not. Descartes responds by arguing that the Pythagorean principle is not a complete thing, and he is discussing complete things. As Cottingham states, “his concept of mind is, he claims, complete; since what he is aware of - his thinking - is enough for him to exist with this and only this attribute[12]". However, we still have the question of how Descartes knows that he will continue to exist without his body. “I think therefore I am” only works if thinking can occur, and if thinking is based on, say, a brain, then Descartes cannot claim that it would still exist without its body. Many have accused Descartes of underestimating the potential complexity of.