Ren? Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz both espouse belief in an infinitely powerful, infinitely wise, and infinitely benevolent God. However, Descartes and Leibniz structure the hierarchy of these three distinctive traits differently as they determine God's actions. Descartes' God is a voluntarist, meaning that God has absolute freedom of indifference. Power is supreme for Descartes. Leibniz opposes the arbitrariness of goodness and truth that derives from Descartes' conception. In response, Leibniz chooses to represent a God whose power is limited by a ruling intellect and benevolence. However, in Leibniz's attempt to find absolute truth and goodness outside of God's power, he limits God's power to such an extent that God's nature is fundamentally altered from the omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent conception that Leibniz claims to have. believe. Ultimately, Descartes' vision of God, although problematic, is more convincing because it does not imply the paradox of a God with limited freedom. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay For Descartes, the power of God is primary. God can will anything to exist. Descartes writes that “every single moment of my entire existence depends on him”. God has complete discretionary freedom in choosing what to create and what not. Descartes “cannot deny that many other things were done by him, or at least could have been done.” God could have created any kind of world, or no world at all, if he wanted, and as one of God's creations, Descartes has "no right" to question the way God chose to create the world and his unique role in it. Although Descartes has no right to question God's choice, he need not worry that God's choice is not the best or most perfect because God is infinitely benevolent. Benevolence is a form of perfection, and since God is all-perfect, He is by definition benevolent. Descartes explains the imperfections of the world by stating that there is a greater perfection achieved by having some parts of the world imperfect, such as human beings. As an imperfect human being, he cannot hope to comprehend that greater perfection. Fundamental for Descartes is the fact that God cannot be a deceiver because he would be an imperfection. He makes sure to point out that God has the power to deceive, but He simply does not have the will to deceive because that would be a flaw. Descartes believes that God is not a deceiver because that would compromise his infinite goodness, but even the idea of ​​what is good or not remains under God's control. "The nature of all goodness and truth is already determined by God." to be true it really is. But not only does God determine what people believe to be true, God also determines truth itself. There is no absolute truth outside of God. As Gary Hatfield writes, even mathematical and logical truths are “established by God and entirely dependent on Him, just as are all his other creations.” God could have created other mathematical truths. Two and two could make five if God willing. Therefore, although mathematical truths seem absolutely true, they are not. They could be otherwise. God is infinitely wise and infinitely benevolent, but the truths He knows and the goodness He abides by were first decided by Himself. God is not held to any external standards. As Hatfield articulates, “nothing in the current set of essences required that God create them instead of others.” Descartes' portrayal of God is disturbing because it makes goodness and truth completely arbitrary. The ultimate standards by which we judge allOur actions and beliefs seem to carry less weight if they were chosen according to God's whim. There is nothing inherent in God's concepts of truth and goodness that required God to choose them. We are God's pawns, we believe whatever He says we believe, and we have no external model by which we know it is right to believe Him. Descartes assures us that God is not a deceiver, but this becomes less comforting if we know that God himself has determined what deception is. It seems less important to say that God is omniscient and omniscient because the terms good and wise have been relativized. The only meaningful definition of God becomes that He is omnipotent. Leibniz is troubled by this image of God. He tries to resolve the problem of the arbitrary nature of goodness and truth that derives from Descartes' theory of power as the supreme distinctive trait of God. Leibniz takes a stand directly against Descartes: «I am far from opinion of those who maintain that there are no rules of goodness and perfection in the nature of things or in the idea that God has of them". Leibniz believes that the idea that things are good because God created them is not sufficient. It undermines the magnificence of God. “Why praise Him for what He has done if He would be equally praiseworthy in doing exactly the opposite?” Leibniz's God, unlike Descartes' voluntarist, is an intellectualist. His infinite intellect and benevolence reign in his infinite power. Leibniz believes that there are standards of truth and goodness that exist outside of God's will. Leibniz believes that there is an infinity of possible worlds that exist in God's intellect, and God chose to create the one that exists because it is the best. There are some necessary truths, like the laws of mathematics, that exist in every single world. The opposite of these truths would be a contradiction. God simply cannot want two and two to equal five. In addition to necessary truths, there are contingent truths specific to each possible world. The opposite of these truths does not imply a contradiction, because they could be otherwise, for example if God had chosen to create a different world than the one he created. However, Leibniz's God has less power than Descartes' even over contingent truths. God had to accept the truths that exist in our world when He chose to create our world. He couldn't create our world and then choose to change some of the laws of our world. Our world existed in God's intellect as it is, with all the truths that exist in our world and all the events that have ever happened and will ever happen. Once he chose our world, he could do nothing to change it. “God foresees things as they are and does not change their nature.” Truths exist independently of his will to realize them through creation. By dividing truths into contingent and necessary, Leibniz hopes to preserve some of both divine and human freedom. If things could have been different, they are not predestined and God and people retain choice over their actions. However, God's infinite benevolence causes a major problem with such reasoning. Since God is infinitely good, he had to choose the best possible world. Leibniz states that "possible notions in themselves do not depend on the free decrees of God". However, it is difficult to believe that other notions and other worlds are truly possible if God were forced by his benevolence to create our world and only our world. Leibniz thinks he maintained God's freedom by distinguishing between metaphysical or absolute necessity and moral necessity. God's choice of this world was not metaphysically necessary because there were other worlds he could have chosen. However, if you take into account his benevolence, it is clear that in reality not.