The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is best remembered for the strident statement: "God is dead," but to reduce him to such a slogan would be to truncate a critique intricate and complex of morality in just three short words. Nietzsche saw the morality of one's social context as a disease inherited through a series of generations. In his 1884 work The Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche traces the roots of morality and thus explains the origin of its pathogen. In this essay I will first explain Nietzsche's criticism of morality and explain his alternative proposal to the modern system. Second, I will evaluate author Alasdair MacIntyre's claim that Nietzsche's denunciation of contemporary moral beliefs closely parallels Hawaiian King Kamehameha II's abolition of kapu, or taboo, in 1819. I will conclude by stating that Nietzsche's argument is valid because it recognizes the necessarily non-foundational character of morality. Unlike the “taboo morality” of Enlightenment thinkers, Nietzsche recognizes that morality – although based on a concept – is spontaneous and irrational. For this reason MacIntyre's connection between Nietzsche and Kamehameha II is not only brilliant, but also well founded. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get Original Essay Critique of Nietzsche's Morality Nietzsche not only thought that the morality of his respective society was flawed or misguided. She thought he was sick. In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche argues that his civilization inherited an acute disease from previous generations. The purpose of his “genealogy,” in essence, is to carefully track down the pathogen affecting his world – and thus denounce the project of the Enlightenment. In the introductory sections of his first essay, Nietzsche launches an assault on “English psychologists,” such as the utilitarian John Stuart Mill, who he claims have shielded their eyes from the truth of morality. Nietzsche states that “these analysts…have specifically trained themselves to sacrifice what is desirable to what is true, any truth, even the simple, bitter, ugly, repugnant, unchristian, and immoral truths – because truths of that description exist. " (10) He harshly criticizes the psychologists of his time because they are not moral historians. They think that the concept of “good” was developed by those who had such goodness, he says, but in reality it arose from a culture of self-affirming aristocrats. Nietzsche identifies the faults of these thinkers to provide the foundation for his argument. immerse yourself in an intricate genealogical critique of morality. Nietzsche begins his history lesson in the period from Homeric Greece to the 8th century BC. In this era the concept of good was coined exclusively by the aristocracy society, “good” was simply a self-affirming term to describe the characteristics that they and only they possessed: physical strength, nobility, wealth, and the like. The judgment of “good” did not originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Rather, it was the good themselves, that is, the aristocrats, the powerful, the people of high rank, the noble people, who felt that they themselves were good and that their actions were good, that is, of the first order, as opposed to all the low, the mean, the vulgar and the plebeians. (11)As a secondary and complementary definition, “bad” was attributed to those individuals who did not express the traitsof the aristocracy and was used to define those characteristics of the lower classes. Nietzsche says that “the fundamental instinct of a superior dominant race is associated with an inferior race, a “subrace”, this is the origin of the antithesis between good and evil”. (11) Based on this distinction, Nietzsche argues that the origin of “good” is “far from having any necessary connection with altruistic acts.” (11) He harshly criticizes the widespread belief that the definition of “good” aligns with such profound and morally good characteristics. Instead, goodness is based on “distinctiveness,” or the concept that aristocrats believe they belong to a higher order than others. (13) To further support this claim, Nietzsche cites historical examples of the “archinotic trait” embodied by past cultures: the Greeks meaning “the truthful” and the Goths deriving from the German word “gut” or god-like. . (13) He also discusses how words with negative connotations, such as “dark” and “black,” most likely arose from the dark-haired European peoples who were overtaken by the blond-haired Aryans. As a rule, Nietzsche concludes, political superiority necessarily implies psychological superiority. (15) The next phase of Nietzsche's genealogy addresses the usurpation of power by the priestly class, which is marked by a movement against some of the most fundamental characteristics of the former noble class. Ironically, he says, the priestly mode originated with the aristocrats but soon named them the main moral enemy. Pure and impure became opposites to be associated with good and evil, and the self-affirming morality of the aristocracy transformed into one largely shaped by self-denial. Nietzsche denigrates this new morality and says that “humanity itself is still sick from the effects of the naivety of this priestly care.” (15) Nietzsche, in his contempt for the priestly modality, however maintains that a positive result has been produced. With this shift in morality, humans have become more complex due to the introduction of the concept of “soul” – something that distinguishes man as “an interesting animal,” he says. (16) Nietzsche attributes the modern disease of morality to its final phase. Slave morality, which emphasized the battle between good and evil, was stimulated by Nietzsche's concept of resentment. This term goes beyond “resentment,” as it requires a suboptimal situation coupled with an inability to escape that situation. Nietzsche says that it is resentment that drives the morality of the altruistic slave, which is not based on love – as many tend to believe – but rather on its direct antithesis. The slaves' weakness "causes their hatred to expand in a monstrous and sinister form, a form that is the most cunning and the most poisonous," he says. (16) Nietzsche defines embittered slaves as the worst enemies precisely because they are the weakest individuals and the greatest haters. The slave revolt in morality precedes the rise to power of the priestly class, in which the upper class is convinced to adhere to a new morality of self-denial in place of that of self-affirmation. Nietzsche says that "slave morality says from the beginning 'no' to what is 'outside itself', 'other than itself' and 'not itself': and this 'no' is its creative act." (19) This “radical transvaluation of values” (17) occurred because of the slave class's deepest desire to achieve ultimate revenge against their oppressors. «Only the miserable are the good: only the poor, the weak, the humble are the good; the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, you are the only pious, the only blessed, because only for them is salvation - but you instead, you aristocrats, you men ofpower, you are for all eternity the wicked, the horrible, the greedy, the insatiable, the wicked; you too will eternally be the unblessed, the cursed, the damned!” (17) Nietzsche contrasts the two modes of morality to further clarify his deep disgust with the mode employed by the slave class. He says that slave morality – “a very clean act of revenge” (17) – was caused by resentment, which differs severely from how the self-affirming morality of aristocrats was originally created. “The 'well born' felt they were 'the happy ones'; they didn't have to artificially create their happiness by looking at their enemies,” he says. They did not have to “lie” to achieve happiness, unlike the slave classes. (20) Furthermore, the aristocratic man "lived in confidence and openness with himself", while the "resentful man" is neither sincere nor honest with himself. (21) The slave revolt conceives and fabricates the idea of ​​an “evil” man – although Nietzsche argues that this man should be honored – and creates in itself a “contrasting and corresponding figure”. (21) In his conclusions, Nietzsche argues that the basis of all forms of civilization is to "domesticate" man and lower him to the level of other humble animals, and that resentment is a mere "instrument of civilization". (23-24) Furthermore, the grave errors of slave morality go unnoticed by the masses and have “disappeared from our sight” only because they have “achieved victory.” (17) Like other long-term processes, Nietzsche claims that the modern mode is difficult to recognize. “The 'redemption' of mankind is proceeding well; everything is obviously becoming Judaized, or Christianized, or vulgarized,” he says. (18-19) Throughout his Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche is more sympathetic to the aristocratic point of view, although he also admits the flaws of that position. He is clearly more critical of slave morality because, while praising its inherently introspective nature, he claims that it is based on a foundation of revenge. Nietzsche's moral ideal As an alternative to the morality that Nietzsche identifies in his own society, he proposes a new modality – a “sigh of hope” – which will manifest «a glimpse of man that justifies the existence of man, a glimpse of incarnated human happiness that realizes and redeems, for the sake of which one can remain steadfast in faith in Man!" (25) Nietzsche's defense of such a morality is supplanted by his ruthless vision of culture modern, since we have effectively lost “the will to be men”. (25) The central and most devastating problem of European society, he argues, was rampant nihilism. The morality proposed by Nietzsche is based on his desire to return to self-affirming moral narrative of ancient times while maintaining the somewhat accidental benefits of later slave morality, i.e. the notion of culture and the complex introspective nature of human beings. Thus, the challenge for Nietzsche is how to reconcile these two necessary elements of his moral proposal. Nietzsche advises his contemporaries to look to their heroes – such as brilliant poets and composers – and not to what he calls “lost men” as the model for this new morality. How man must manifest himself in the world and how he must act as a moral agent, he argues, lies in the ever-important “will to power.” Nietzsche describes this phenomenon in his 1886 work Beyond Good and Evil: “[Everything that] is a living and not dying body… will have to be an incarnate will to power, will strive to grow, spread, take possession , become predominant – not because of morality or immorality, but because it is life and because life is simply the will to power… which is after all the will to life. (Section 259)Nietzsche lays the foundation for the theory of the will to power in his Genealogy of Morals when he draws the distinction between lambs and birds of prey. It is understandable and completely natural that a lamb perceives birds of prey as evil creatures, but in his opinion this point of view is neither founded nor valid. For Nietzsche, the bird's action of preying on a lamb is simply an expression of its strength: the action and the “agent” are therefore separate entities. It would be wrong to distinguish the strength of the bird from its ability to kill. He maintains that “he who acts is a mere appendage of action” and, furthermore, “action is everything”. (26) The lamb's perspectiveFor ​​Nietzsche's contemporaries it is precisely what is wrong with morality, he says. “Man has been tamed,” his greatness stifled by resentment, pity and invalid sympathy. (31) A critic might argue that if Nietzsche attacks morality on moral grounds, his argument will be seriously weakened, if not obliterated. After all, if Nietzsche finds immeasurable flaws in the entire history of human morality, what makes his proposed way different? Furthermore, because Nietzsche finds flaws in the Enlightenment project – or in the search for the foundation of morality – a critic would say that it is hypocritical of him to form his own morality based on the “will to power”. But to make this argument is to fail to understand the entire Nietzschean project. Because Nietzsche's moral foundation of humanity, the “will to power,” is not really a foundation after all. The will to power is simultaneously spontaneous, irrational and illogical. Unlike the moral foundations of Hume, Kant and Kierkegaard – passion, reason and choice respectively – Nietzsche's “non-foundation” is only a foundation as it guides us all. Although the will to power is indeed universal to all men, its manifestations are not. In other words, although every man is endowed with a will to power, it will invariably manifest itself in different ways for different people. Here lies the fundamental difference between Nietzsche and the Enlightenment thinkers that he refutes in his Genealogy of Morals. In After Virtue, MacIntyre says that Nietzsche wants us to become “autonomous moral subjects by some gigantic and heroic act of will.” This "new table" for morality must be built entirely starting from the individual. (114)MacIntyre, Nietzsche and Kamehameha II Nietzsche attacks the “taboo” morality of his own cultural context. The contemporary mode, he argues, seeks to rationalize the inherently irrational character of humanity's will to power. In other words, the morality of Nietzsche's time is simply a vain attempt to justify the unjustifiable. The morality proposed by Nietzsche is a modality that harks back to an ancient morality while incorporating the positive, albeit accidental, benefits of the seriously flawed morality of the "slave revolt." Fundamental to this new morality is the need to recognize and understand why morality is fundamentally irrational. In After Virtue, MacIntyre describes the strength of the Nietzschean position as dependent on “the truth of a central thesis”: “[T]hat all rational claims of morality manifestly fail and that therefore belief in the principles of morality must be explained in terms of a set of rationalizations that hide the fundamentally non-rational phenomena of the will”. (117) Furthermore, he explains Nietzsche's argument as follows: “[If] there are nothing in morality but expressions of the will, my morality can only be what my will creates. There can be no place for fictions such as natural rights, utility, the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. Now I have to create new ones myself.