Topic > The relationship between freedom of thought and discussion and freedom in general

Mill's “On Freedom” is an academic work that examines the presence of – and desire for – freedom in human nature and behavior, as well as the limits imposed on freedom as. Mill writes this text from a bias of utilitarianism and fallibilism, as he believes at the same time that: (1) the ultimate goal of human life - the purest of actions, in itself - is to bring about the greatest good for the most of people, and this; (2) humans are an imperfect species and not recognizing this is presupposing one's own infallibility which, according to Mill, is wrong. Therefore, the following article will examine the relationship between freedom of thought and discussion and freedom in general as proposed by Mill. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay First, and most fundamentally, we need to understand what we are referring to when we discuss Mill's definition of freedom. However, it is not possible to offer a one-dimensional definition to such a multidimensional concept and, necessarily, an analysis of Mill's mental processes must be conducted to understand his perception of freedom, in its truest form. Almost immediately Mill states that On Liberty will concern “civil, or social, liberty: the nature and limits of the power which may legitimately be exercised by society over the individual” (Mill 1859, p. 1). We can therefore see that Mill – working in a way relevant to classical philosophical practices – himself chose to demonstrate what freedom is by first understanding exactly what it is not. This statement is further verified by Mill's reference to the "struggle between freedom and authority" (p. 1), thus alluding to the statement that: freedom is the phenomenon of action - or thought - undertaken by choice of the individual without no involvement of authority.Mill develops this idea by briefly exploring changes in the general perception of freedom throughout history. At this point it is interesting to note Mill's apparent consideration of Western cultures alone – drawing on evidence from “Greece, Rome and England” (p. 1) – rather than an analysis that holistically considers diverse and global cultures. Regardless, Mill develops his initial hypothesis – about what freedom is – by identifying key points in history that he believes shaped and developed this concept into its current form. These points are: (1) the transition from a body of authority seen as “in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people they governed” (p. 1) to an imposition of limits on that authority; (2) the emergence of a “new demand for elective and temporary rulers” (p. 2); (3) revelation that “rulers should be identified with the people, that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation” (p. 3), and; (4) the eventual prevalence of a democratic republic – “people's government” (p. 3) – and the “notion that people need not limit their power over themselves” (p. 3). Although, on the surface, this chronology might lead one to believe that Mill perceives the balance between freedom and authority to have been achieved, it is clear that Mill recognizes the faults within said political structure; “Phrases like 'self-government' and 'the people's power over themselves' do not represent the true situation” (p. 3-4). As such, Mill identifies the danger that the freedom of the majority suppresses the freedom of the minority; “The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the largest or most active part of the people – the majority” (p. 4). These essentially lay the foundation for recognitionMill's view of “social tyranny” and “political oppression” (p. 4) as two forces equally capable of repressing freedom. Mill then introduces the dilemma according to which: freedom – which was originally thought of as freedom from the interference of authority, of government, in people's lives – cannot be actualized. when the freedom of one prevails and prevents the freedom of another . This logic precedes Mill's statement that: "Everything that makes existence valuable to someone depends on the application of restrictions on the actions of other people" (p. 5) which complements Mill's earlier statement of the "notion according to where people do not need to limit their actions." power over oneself” (p. 3). Convoluted as they may seem, these premises are the basis upon which Mill articulates the complexity of the nature of simultaneously existing individual and social freedom; the paradoxical nature of humanity is such that: we each claim to want freedom for all in our lives, but we refuse to recognize the fact that this desire leaves us, individually, vulnerable to an intrusion into our lives by a other than exercising their freedom. Understanding this, let us for a moment consider the above through the prejudices of Mill as a utilitarian and fallibilist: if an action is deemed beneficial only when instigated for the greatest benefit of the greatest number of people and human beings are fallible and therefore incapable of knowing – with absolute certainty: whether an action will actually bring benefits or not. Then, doesn't it seem that human beings would be unable to use their freedom – individual or social – in means known to be beneficial? What then is the value of freedom itself if it did not benefit the masses? In response to this apparent contradiction with his own argument, Mill states that “over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” (p. 9) and that since “man is a progressive being ” (p. 10) the restriction of his freedoms will not only: (1) prevent the immediate promotion of developments beneficial to humanity, but also: (2) limit the potential for future developments. This statement could be resisted simply by rearranging the above premises, replacing 'restriction' with condonation, 'prevent' with allow, 'beneficial' with harmful, and 'limit' with increase. However, it is likely that Mill would be the first to remind anyone that: an argument similar to this is more easily compared to an authoritative ruler of Ancient Greece (as mentioned above) than to any leader of the modern world, thus refuting the argument theory as no longer relevant. However, Mill admits that decisions made through one's freedom may occasionally prevent – ​​or limit – decisions that another is able to make through one's freedom. Thus, he introduces the harm-to-others principle (pages 9-10) essentially stating that each individual deserves the freest of liberties up to the point where his or her actions, or inactions, directly affect another. Therefore, he argues, it is justified that “sanctions of law or opinion” are involved (p. 7). Considering all of the above, one can understand Mill's final definition regarding “the proper region of human freedom” (p. 11). The definition is this: human freedom exists in three parts. First; freedom over the inner domain of conscience – thought, feeling, opinion and other similar moral sentiments – which, intrinsically, includes the freedom to write and publish such opinions. Second; freedom to act on the basis of that conscience, to structure one's life to suit one's character and not according to social guidelines. Thirdly; the freedom of equality, so that everyone has – and uses –the aforementioned freedoms equally (individually and en masse) without fear of oppression (p. 11-12). Simply put, the three dimensions that Mill uses to define freedom are: (1) morality, the freedom to decide for oneself what is right and what is wrong; (2) action, the ability to live one's life according to one's morals, and; (3) unity, the freedom for all to use their liberties in the community without persecution. Mill reiterates the importance of these statements: "no society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free" (p. 12), this freedom, in his opinion, depends largely on maintaining an adequate balance between “individual independence and social control” (p. 5) – thus avoiding “social tyranny more formidable than many forms of political oppression” (p. 4)-. Now, before moving forward, it is crucial to recognize that Mill assumes that all human beings are essentially good and morally just people. Drawing on Socratic ideals, Mill believes that the soul of a human being – its essence, its purest form – is in no way disgusting, vindictive, manipulative, or unfairly judgmental. Rather, he believes that each of these attitudes is learned – as reality corrupts the soul – and can be unlearned, or more appropriately: that kindness and purity can be remembered. When we recognize this assumption made by Mill, it is easy to understand why he claims that freedom of thought and discussion is the most essential of all freedoms; that total freedom of opinion and expression is the foundation on which any free society must be built. Mill states that: “if all mankind but one were of the same opinion, and only one person were of the opposite opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that person than they, if they had the power, would be justified in silencing humanity” (p. 16). As such, he develops his argument to consider three potential scenarios of a silenced opinion: (1) the stifled opinion is potentially true; (2) the suppressed opinion is potentially false and; (3) the stifled opinion is neither entirely true nor false, but rather a component of the truth, a missing aspect of the currently held opinion. By assuming that one of these three scenarios is the reality of any situation, Mill ignores its meaning. Indeed, Mill states that “all silence of discussion is a presupposition of infallibility” since it is assumed that “their certainty is equal to absolute certainty” (p. 17). Statements that agree with Mill's bias as a fallibilist and highlight Mill's perspective that: it is irrelevant whether or not an opinion is true or false, it still deserves to exist. The logic of this statement derives from the fact that "there is the biggest difference between presuming an opinion to be true because, despite having every possibility of contesting it, it has not been refuted, and presuming its truth in order to not allow its refutation" ; any opinion that prevails over all conflicting perspectives can be assumed to be truth until such time as it is proven false by a counterargument, as long as it is subjected to such counterarguments; “It is only through the clash of adverse opinions that the rest of the truth has some chance of being provided” (p. 50). Participating in this process – arguing hypotheses, challenging what is taken as fact, and actively seeking to broaden one's horizons – is, Mill argues, the only means by which human beings gain wisdom (p. 19). Further understanding – in the context of Mill's utilitarian prejudice – that “the truth of an opinion is part of its usefulness” (p. 21) justifies the motivation for these actions and the desire to seek the truth and.