The Battle of Chipyong-ni has been considered one of the best examples of regimental defense in military history. The battle took place from February 13 to 15, 1951. The Allied forces consisted of the United States and our French partners. The enemy forces consisted mainly of 25,000 Chinese soldiers. The 23rd Regimental Combat Team and the Chipyong-ni defensive perimeter were led by COL Paul Freeman. His leadership and tactical skill had a major influence on the outcome of the Korean War. COL Freeman's ability to apply mission command principles enabled a successful Allied counterattack, ultimately leading to the Armistice of the 38th Parallel. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essayCOL Freeman was born June 29, 1907 and died April 17, 1988. He graduated from the United States Military Academy on June 13, 1932 He was stationed at Fort Sam Houston, Fort Benning and in China before the Korean War. His previous duties included company commander, CO/BN maintenance officer, assistant military attaché at the US Embassy in China, instructor for the Chinese and Indian armies, director of weapons training for the Brazil-US Joint Military Commission and U.S. Army delegation to the Inter-American Defense Council. “With the outbreak of the Korean War, he deployed to that theater as commander of the 23rd Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Infantry Division, and remained in command until he was wounded in February 1951 at Chipyong-ni.” Although COL Freeman had an outstanding defense regiment that turned the tide of the war, the peninsula had already been at war for seven months. The Korean War was a back and forth power struggle. One side would gain the advantage and then lose it after a critical attack. The conflict originated from the division of the North and the South in 1945. North Korea chose the socialist approach by aligning its support with China and the Soviet Union. The South chose a capitalist approach and aligned its views with those of the United States. Both the Northern and Southern leadership claimed to represent the entire peninsula. North Korea began the assault and declared war on June 25, 1950. The United Nations organized a fighting force to defeat North Korean aggression. The United States made up approximately 90% of this fighting force. Allied forces were unable to sustain combat operations and logistical supply routes. They were pushed back to the 140-mile Pusan ​​Perimeter. Even though the North Korean army was winning, it made a fatal mistake by enlarging its army too much. This allowed the allies to gather forces and “draw a line in the sand… it was becoming clear that the North Koreans would not be able to move beyond the Pusan ​​Perimeter. This battle lasted from August 4 to September 18, 1950. While Allied forces maintained a defense area in the south, Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur made the bold decision to send approximately 70,000 Marines from the southern port of Pusan, around the coast western South Korea, to land on the beaches of Incheon. The plan, codenamed Operation Chromite, was executed on September 15, 1950. This strategy cut North Korean supply lines and allowed Allied forces to capture Seoul on September 26. killing or capturing thousands of enemy soldiers.” Allied forces continued to push the North Korean threat towards the Chinese border. On October 19, 1950, “United Nations forces capture the North Korean capital Pyongyang, which is 90 miles away.northwest of the 38th parallel". By October 25, 1950, North Korean troops were pushed back against the Yulu River. Chinese soldiers engaged some sections of the allied forces. This is important because it became the first instance of China's involvement in the Korean War. November 25, 1950 China responded with approximately 300,000 troops, forcing the Allied forces to hastily withdraw. “The CCF (Chinese Communist Forces) assault took General MacArthur and the UN forces completely by surprise and almost instantly turned the tide of the war.” Task Force Faith, under the command of LTC Don C. Faith, took the full force of the attack. Their aggressive defense allowed the Marines to retreat. As Task Force Faith began to deteriorate, stragglers began the march to join the Marines. “The survivors, along with other soldiers from the 7th ID, were organized into a provisional battalion and assigned to the 7th Marines. Known as the 31/7, the battalion participated in the escape of the 1st Marine Division from Hagaru-ri to the coast starting on 6 December. "North Korean/Chinese forces continued to push back the Allied forces and recaptured Seoul on January 4, 1951. The Allied forces held the line approximately 30 miles from Seoul and began to conduct counteroffensive operations. The situation began to slowly change on January 31, 1951 when the 23rd Regimental Combat Team was sent to destroy enemy units near the railway tunnels about three miles southeast of Chipyong-ni. The battle was considered a success and allowed COL Freeman to occupy Chipyong-ni Freeman had his unit occupy positions at Chipyong-ni, he noted that he did not have enough soldiers to man the large mountainous perimeter. With only 4,500 men, he decided to move them back to a narrower position to keep the lines together could not escape their defenses. This area consisted of about 12 miles of ridges, but the men occupied only an area of ​​about 4 miles. During this repositioning there was a debate whether the United States wanted to hold Chipyong-ni or disengage and move further south. The reason for this was that the Chinese forces seemed impossible to beat due to the large number of soldiers. Colonel Freeman did not want to stay because he did not think he could successfully establish a defense strong enough to resist the endless amount of Chinese soldiers. After being rebuffed, he called for immediate airstrikes and resupply missions. He also quickly began preparations to include the organization of the attached units. COL Freeman's defense consisted of his original force, a French battalion and the First Ranger Company. COL Freeman coordinated artillery and close air support prior to the morning of 13 February 1951 across the 37th Field Artillery Battalion and 503rd Field Artillery Battalion. This would be extremely important because coordinated fires would prevent large numbers of enemies from moving rapidly across a sector. During the battle it was noted that "any daytime advance was brought to an abrupt halt by the expert use of artillery by the defender (23rd RCT), but would provide only a momentary respite as the enemy began to prepare a night attack on the defences." the 23rd Regimental Combat Team consisted of deep trenches and barbed wire spread along the most likely avenues of approach. This was fine for daylight hours, but for night operations they placed booby traps that would produce a flare in the area signaling enemy presence. This disciplined initiative also led to the placement of fougasse (napalm) along the entire line so that, when detonated, it would envelop the enemy in ablazing fire. Each placement of an obstacle or armored squad position provided the best possible tactical advantage. In addition to the obstacles, COL Freeman exercised disciplined intuition as he set out to gather as much ammunition as possible. “It got to the point that he began to fear he would get in trouble for accumulating so much if a battle didn't occur.” This would prove vital during the upcoming battle. Before the upcoming battle took place, COL Freeman ensured that final preparations were completed and the men were ready. He created a shared understanding that the enemy had them surrounded, made sure each company knew its section and responsibilities, and made sure its subordinates understood the importance of the events that were about to unfold. His subordinate leaders exploited the common operational picture and COL Freeman's intent to engage the enemy and execute battle exercises that same night. On February 13, 1951 a machine gun crew noticed lit torches moving down a distant hill. They decided to involve the shadowy figures. Lieutenant Robert Peters was writing a letter in his tent when he heard the noise and went to check. He shouted to his battery executive officer, Lieutenant McKinney: “get up, McKinney; there he is!". Although the enemy surrounded the 23rd RCT, it appeared that Company G's sector had been hit hard. Once the enemy began to make heavy contact, officers in each platoon began to identify friction points and react to the contact. The officers were organizing counterattacks and recovering the wounded. They often had to motivate frightened soldiers to move. Lieutenant Heath, commander of Company G, ordered artillerymen to reinforce the 3rd Platoon's position. “Heath grabbed a couple of men by their clothes, yelling, 'Goddamn it, get back up that hill! You're going to die down here anyway. You might as well go up the hill and die there... When the gunners tried to find cover, Lieutenant Heath ran back and forth yelling and pulling at the men to get them to get up and move. He and other leaders understood the critical need to hold the line. They fully embodied the mission command principles that COL Freeman had emphasized before the battle. Some men were absolutely terrified, but they carried out their tasks confident that their leaders would make good decisions. “This phenomenon (unshakeable confidence) has caused both the leaders and the led to surpass their abilities to a level of performance matched by few units.” This trust was first established when COL Freeman used his leadership and good judgment to achieve victory for his men at the Battle of the Twin Tunnels. COL Freeman's second example of trust building was his continued attempts to spend time with his Soldiers. He would walk in line every day. He stopped “to talk to the soldiers and reassure them that things were going well.” He expressed genuine care for his soldiers. This unmatched trust is important because it maximizes Soldiers' willingness to complete the mission for their brothers. This trust was also earned through the level of risk COL Freeman was willing to accept throughout the battle. He had already agreed to move the soldier away from the hilltops and closer to the road. This calculated decision, combined with coordinated close air support, “proved to be a major advantage that evened the battlefield.” He also accepted a certain level of risk by keeping his reserves in the rear until he absolutely needed them. He used those=118978