In the second meditation of the Meditations on the first philosophy, Descartes addresses the question of identity: “I am, I exist... But this 'I' that must exist–– I still don't really understand what it's about. (Descartes 4) The only circumstance that helps establish identity is that Descartes thinks – in fact, it is the only thing that can guarantee. We can therefore come to the conclusion that, by establishing that we are essentially a thinking thing, Descartes also establishes that identity depends on the mind, not on the body. This distinctive attribution of what a person truly is lays the foundation for Descartes' ideas of mind-body dualism, in which the mind and body essentially exist as separate entities. Descartes' argument takes two main forms – divisibility, doubtability and conceivability – each of which can be deconstructed in deductive arguments to demonstrate the difference between mind and body. However, there are logical errors and discrepancies in the premises and conclusions that call into question the validity of Descartes' dualist position. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay The logical argument for divisibility in support of dualism is as follows: All extended things are divisible. No mind is divisible. No mind is an extended thing. Upon initial contemplation, the first premise appears to be true. In the extended world, matter continually changes shape, reshapes itself, or shatters. It is simple to conceptualize physical things being divided. Take an apple, for example: cut it in half, remove the core and cut it into wedges. What would happen, though, if we went further? We divided it into smaller and smaller sections, until the piece of apple was so small that it couldn't be cut with a knife. Yet the apple exists and is a physical, extensive thing. And so we can divide it further, into a single piece of matter, into a single atom, into its atomic components: electrons and quarks. But then what? We started with an apple, which is undoubtedly an extended thing, so surely the matter we have left is also an extended thing, being produced by the division of some physical object. Yet, by continuing to divide the apple into its simplest components, we end up with pieces of an extended thing that is in its purest form and is no longer divisible. Therefore, the first premise that states that all physical things are divisible cannot be true. If the first premise is false, the second premise is rendered useless. Whether the mind is divisible or not tells us nothing; there is no correlation between extended things and divisibility. Even if we assumed the second premise to be true, there would be no way to conclude that “no mind is an extended thing,” since the quality of indivisibility tells us nothing about the physicality of an object. The second premise itself is not entirely correct, since in some sense the mind is actually divisible. While the divisibility in question with the first premise concerns spatial divisibility, it can be argued that the mind exhibits temporal divisibility. Everyone, sooner or later, has experienced an "empty moment" or dreamless sleep, during which no images or thoughts exist in the mind. In these cases, the continuity of the mind is broken. Descartes states in the Second Meditation: “I conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, must be true every time I affirm it or think it.” (Descartes 4) After rejecting the second premise of the divisibility argument, Descartes' identification of himself exclusively as an essentially thinking thing is no longer reasonable, since, if Descartes stopped thinking, he would also cease to exist. There are moments in everyday life,like those mentioned before, during which consciousness takes a break. The Second Meditation also introduces the topic of doubt, which can be summarized as follows: I can doubt that my body exists. I cannot doubt that I exist as a thinking thing. I, as a thinking thing, am not identical to my body. Considering the argument itself, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. The problem of justification is deciding what determines identity. The following is a modification of the argument from doubt, which "makes use of Leibniz's Law of Identity... x is identical to y if, and only if, for every property p possessed by x at time t, y also has p at, and vice versa” (Calef) by adding another premise. My body has the property of being such as to be able to doubt its existence. I, a thinking thing, do not have the property of being such as to be able to doubt its existence my existence. If two things are identical, then they have exactly the same properties. I, as a thinking thing, am not identical to my body. In applying Leibniz's law, Descartes establishes that the mind and the body are different entities because they do not they have the same doubtability property. Although the modification makes the argument logically valid, the question lies in whether or not doubtfulness is a property that can also be used for the identity of an object: “doubt... is a property of mine, not [of the object in question].” (Calef) In other words, to doubt is to be without conviction or to believe that something is uncertain. Objects do not intrinsically possess the quality of being doubtful; it is applied to them by the doubter. Therefore, since Descartes doubts the existence of his body but does not doubt the existence of his mind, it does not follow that the two are essentially different. While Descartes explains why he doubts the external world and why he believes that the mind exists without a doubt, exactly opposite views could easily be held and the premises would remain true from the conclusions. This demonstrates that doubt, by itself, no matter how strongly held, is not a solid measure of identity comparison. Descartes's conceivability argument, as introduced in the Sixth Meditation, falls into a similar margin of error: I can conceive that I, a thinking thing, exist without my extended body existing. Everything I can conceive is logically possible. If it is logically possible for X to exist without Y, then Thus, conceivability, as used in the first premise, neither confirms nor denies anything about the nature of the mind separate from the body. One could just as easily conceive of a world in which mind and body are mutually necessary. Ex nihilo nihil fit – a phrase first coined by the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, meaning that nothing comes from nothing – is the main principle on which the second premise is based. “Everything I can conceive,” or ideas, is connected to what Descartes considered objective reality, which is simply composed of representations. What they represent are elements internal to formal reality, which are things exclusively of the external world, things that are "logically possible". Despite this connection, they still take distinct and separate forms. However, to what extent should these ideas within objective reality be related to their counterparts in formal reality? Take, for example, the fantastic animals mentioned in the First Meditation: “For even when painters try to represent mermaids and satyrs with the most extraordinary bodies, they simply mix the limbs of different kinds of real animals, instead of inventing natures which are completely new."(Descartes 2) Satyrs and mermaids are things that exist only in objective reality. Their formal connections are not actual satyrs and mermaids, but rather the physical figures of humans, goats, and fish, the formal elements of which mythical beasts are composed. Consequently, the second premise is not entirely valid. Aconception arises from things that are logically possible, but it is not true that everything conceivable is logically possible. If that were the case, there would be no such thing as fiction. Descartes proposes several explanations in support of the substance-mind-body dualism, each of which has its own form of merit and novelty – an obvious fact, since Descartes supported the time-tested thesis and was a major source of controversial issues all over the world. within the philosophical community. However, when extracted from pedagogical philosophy and placed in everyday context, there are some gaps in the development of what follows from dualism and what this means for the ordinary person. For Descartes' dualism argument to be relevant and convincing, there are three components that must be successfully addressed: what, where, and how. The sixth meditation addresses the question of the unity of the distinct parts of the mind and body. It is indisputable that, even when established as distinct entities, the mind and body are closely intertwined, so much so that for the common man, the dualistic phenomenon is one that may never cross the mind. Descartes identifies the thing as such: “I (a thinking thing) am not simply in my body as a sailor is on a ship. Rather, I am closely united with it – mixed with it, so to speak – so that it and I form a unity.” (Descartes 30). The mind and body, although separate, act as one. Where this is approached in a very scientific way, Descartes uses anatomical knowledge to identify a specific place in the brain where mind-body interaction occurs. In the Passions of the Soul, Descartes identifies “a certain part of the body where it exercises its functions in a more particular way than in all the others” (Descartes 9). The pineal gland, he decides, is the only place where "the soul can directly exercise its functions" in a unified place (Descartes 9). In this work, he further elaborates the idea of ​​“sense organs” – eyes, hands, ears – within the human anatomy that help bridge the mind-body relationship and translate the external world into a way that the mind can perceive. The question of how this relationship occurs, however, is not one that is detailed in either the Meditations on First Philosophy or the Passions of the Soul. As Scott Calef, professor of philosophy at Ohio Wesleyan University, said it best: “If the dualist does not know or cannot say how mind and body interact, what follows about dualism? Nothing special." (Calef) This is a question that cannot be addressed only conceptually, like the what, because it remains too broad and imprecise. Science, a field that covers only the structures of the physical world, was well suited to answer where, but not good enough to explain the whole story since, within the diegesis of the Meditations, it was established that the mind has no extension. If anyone should have the ability to understand the nature of this interaction, it would be Descartes, which in itself professes to be a marital reconciliation between philosophy and science. It must be recognized, however, that it is simply too much to expect infallible argument and flawless logic, with every question answered – after all, with these things, there would be no place for philosophy. The Meditations conclude with Descartes' call to action, stating that we all "must recognize the weakness of our nature," admitting the inherent defects that preside over us all (Descartes 34).: