Roe v. Wade in 1973 precipitated a divisive conflict over abortion rights in America from an issue state to a national issue. Roe constitutionalized the choice of abortion under the right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, allowing state interference only in the third trimester of pregnancy. Theoretical studies have linked public opinion to policy formation, underlining how its impact depends on the importance of the issue among citizens and the involvement of interest groups. Despite its apparent consistency since 1973, public opinion on abortion is incredibly complex, with disagreements about what circumstances justify an abortion as well as methodological problems regarding the wording and ordering of questions in surveys. Daniel Williams and Barbara Craig argue that public opinion has played an indirect role on the Supreme Court and politicians. Others, such as Linda Greenhouse, have argued that Roe was substantially influenced by growing political movements in the 1960s, while Donald Critchlow suggests that the rise of the pro-life movement influenced the passage of anti-abortion laws. Meanwhile, Howard Ball and David Garrow have highlighted the importance of Supreme Court justices, particularly their values ​​and ideological leanings, in abortion policy developments. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Ultimately, the general public had an insignificant impact on abortion policy, with smaller groups of activists proving central to political developments. In the 1970s, presidents were remarkably attentive to public opinion as a whole, but polarization affected politicians and activists before the general public, increasing the involvement of interest groups in policymaking. Congress passed minimal abortion policy, initially due to electoral considerations by members to avoid abortion decision-making, while legislative success remained elusive in the 1980s as congressional divisions coalesced with the fragmentation of the pro-life movement. Finally, Supreme Court cases have generally been influenced to some extent by activist groups, although the underlying question of justices' values ​​has become more significant since 1989, illustrating how judicial philosophies have greatly shaped abortion policy all over the world. inside the Court. This essay will be structured around the three branches of the federal government, evaluating the influence of public opinion on abortion policy from 1965 to 1992 and how these institutions distributed and influenced each other's decision making. Several Supreme Court rulings before Roe emerged as a result of the litigation strategy devised by pro-choice activists rather than the broader public. Patricia Windle argues that change was inevitable in the late 1960s, when a broad movement advocating the expansion of personal rights was emerging. Liberating advances, such as that of the pill, have motivated women to exercise greater independence and to agitate for the right to abortion. However, Windle's argument overlooks the fact that only 40% supported a pro-choice position in 1969, most of whom limited abortion to cases in which the mother was ill or had been raped. Indeed, abortion was still a minor issue, with a policy driven by a smaller group of activists,composed largely of medical professionals, who used federal litigation to initiate change. These activists used the right to privacy, established in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, to attack anti-abortion statutes in California and Columbia through People v. Belous in 1969 and United States v. Vuitch in 1971 respectively. Garrow points out that both cases constituted an endorsement of the litigation strategy, including a large number of female plaintiffs and including amicus briefs signed by doctors and lawyers. These successes spurred further plans, evidenced by the assistance of attorneys Roy Lucas and Richard Samuel in appealing Dr. Sherwin Raymond's abortion conviction, seeing an opportunity to repeal anti-abortion laws in New Jersey. Progress would have been unlikely without the fact that most lawyers were middle class and pro-choice, or without the tolerant Warren Court, which ruled in a liberal direction on 76 percent of cases during the 1960s. However, the initiative and strategy of pro-choice activists have shaped the nature of these cases, acting as a driving force behind the sentences. Roe was thus not a Supreme Court response to pro-choice public opinion, but rather the culmination of activists. "litigation strategy". Russell Hittinger points out that in 1973, 60% of states still banned abortion. Furthermore, the reform measures introduced generally lacked de facto implementation, as demonstrated by the fact that only 25 legal abortions per month occurred in Colorado and North Carolina, implying a lack of public approval for abortion. new laws. Although Gallup polls from 1969-72 show an increase in pro-choice support from 40% to 46%, this is still a low level when considering the scope of the change initiated in Roe. Additionally, detailed polling by the National Opinion Research Center reveals considerable disagreement over approved circumstances for abortion hidden from more general polling, with more than 50% opposed to abortion for relationship or family reasons. Instead, the Roe decision-making process further illustrates the situational impact of litigation strategy and the broader pro-choice movement. Robert McKeever highlights how Roe, and Doe v. Bolton, were class actions, organized and financed by pro-choice interest groups, who were becoming increasingly influential outside the courtroom in 1973. Indeed, Greenhouse identifies how the movement incorporated women seeking abortion on demand, reflecting the broader emergence of abortion as a national issue. Radical individuals, such as Patricia Maginnis, and groups, particularly NARAL, have organized petitions and initiatives, advocating for abortion rights in demonstrations to attract national media attention and support. The publicity and intensity of the movement likely created the perception of large-scale support, significant in light of Judge Rehnquist's admission in 1986 that, "[since judges] watch television, read newspapers, talk to family , it would be remarkable if they were not "unswayed by the tides of public opinion." Considering that the Burger Court has only twice issued more than 50% of its annual rulings in a liberal direction, the justices' radical decision to allow abortion upon request within certain statutes creates the impression of outside influence on the Court. John Ely appears overzealous in arguing that the justices acted on their own beliefs about Roe. However, the ruling certainly illustrates the integration of opinions held by the pro-choice movement rather than the general public, adhering to the thesis ofGreenhouse that the justices saw abortion through the eyes of medical elites and feminist activists. Supreme Court rulings therefore appear to be influenced to some extent by activist movements, although Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services in 1989 disproves this trend. Before Webster, free-choice advocates filed 49 briefs, wrote about 40,000 letters a day and organized a 300,000-person march on Washington in April 1989, trying to capture media attention and influence judges. However, Webster rejected the choice of abortion as a fundamental right to privacy, allowing state discretion over the financing and availability of abortion. Karen O'Connor suggests that the ruling was a result of the conservative makeup of the bench, after O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy had been appointed by Reagan. However, O'Connor's interpretation is overly simplistic in analyzing the opinion, revealing how the opportunity to overturn Roe was opposed by Sandra O'Connor, arguing that it would violate "the fundamental rule of judicial restraint." When explaining his actions, Maltz highlights O'Connor's centrist approach, moving between the Court's conservative and liberal blocs on several cases. However, his action arises above all from his judicial philosophy; in his confirmation hearings, O'Connor openly stated his preference for federal judicial restraint, believing that the Court should enforce laws rather than make policies. Furthermore, although her study is limited to O'Connor's first three years on the bench, Barbara Bruckman highlights the trend toward judicial restraint in O'Connor's decisions, limiting the Court's power and protecting state interests. When you consider that O'Connor's appointment was motivated primarily by her gender, the justices' significance becomes further apparent. Indeed, such reasoning juxtaposes limitations on the Court's presidential influence by the general public with the Court's broader jurisdiction to block executive policy if deemed necessary. As a result, the Court considerably influences the politics and decision-making of other branches, determined to a large extent by the philosophies of sitting justices. The decision in the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey case to uphold Roe's "central holding" further illustrates the importance of Supreme Court justices in determining sentences. Despite widespread expectations that the case would overturn Roe, the majority opinion reaffirmed the choice of abortion, although restrictions were put in place, as long as they did not impose an "undue burden" on women seeking an abortion. A reversal was expected, since eight justices had been appointed by Republican presidents and the only Democratic appointee, Byron White, had dissented in the Roe case. However, Casey saw O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter joining Blackmun and Stevens in the majority. The opinion justifies its decision differently from previous rulings, stating that “the Court must make decisions…founded in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures.” The ruling is therefore an example of stare decisis, which binds judges to Roe precedent. The ruling emphasized that Roe's reasoning had not changed, overlooking the pro-life opposition that encouraged its overturning. This decision relates to the changing dynamic of the Court following the appointments of Kennedy and Souter. Expected conservatives upon their confirmation, Fliter and Tomlins highlight how both have proven more liberal, treating cases on an individual basis. Once again,these appointments reveal the president's limited influence on abortion policy, forced to appoint more moderate judges to please activists and the Senate, consequently making the Court more unpredictable in its rulings. Ultimately, Webster and Casey establish that judges are crucial determinants of abortion policy, influenced to a lesser extent by the executive, which has no freedom in appointing judges and operates through indirect means in seeking policy changes through simulation methodology of the Court. Ronald Weber reveals a positive relationship between abortion liberalization and pro-choice public opinion before Roe. States such as California, Colorado and Hawaii have liberalized their abortion laws, in contrast to the failure to introduce similar legislation in Minnesota and Michigan. It is reasonable to argue that the general public partially influenced the decision-making process, since these decisions were made before the 1970 election, suggesting that legislators acted in ways deemed popular. The Hawaii case study appears to support this thesis, as both parties have adopted strongly liberalized positions, competing for the 53% of people who support pro-choice abortion laws. However, the passage of the legislation was influenced to a greater extent by Hawaii's unions. Steinhoff points out how these groups used their size and political power in elections to convince lawmakers to pass the bill. Furthermore, in Colorado in 1967, Lader described the passage of the deregulation bill as the product of an “internal” strategy, as several political leaders worked within the legislature to pressure state legislators. Such evidence therefore assumes that the general public has an indirect influence on legislators, but that their general apathy towards abortion means that most changes are driven by activist groups. The New York legislation further highlights the importance of activism in influencing abortion policy. The Cook bill was passed in 1970, allowing abortion up to the 24th week of pregnancy. Weber's research suggests that 52 percent favored a liberalized law, but this success was unexpected due to the strength of the Catholic Church in New York, which rallied against a similar bill in 1967. Williams points out that most legislators opposed liberalization, aware of the importance of abortion among Catholics and that allowing the choice of abortion would destroy their political careers. The explanation behind this change in attitude on the part of legislators is revealed by George Michaels' reasoning for voting yes to "have some peace" in his family. Therefore, it appears that the vote was not influenced by organized interest groups, but "by the wives of the Senate and Assembly", as noted by Governor Rockefeller. Such evidence highlights individual-based activism on the part of these women, reaffirming the importance of the intensity of opinions in bringing about change. At the same time, Williams illustrates how the passage of the bill reflects the impact of non-activism, identifying the complacent approach of the Catholic Church, which took no action, believing that the legislation would not pass. This case study therefore reaffirms the importance of public activism in determining abortion policy, necessary to both initiate and block legislation. The only major abortion-related legislation passed by Congress was the Hyde Amendment in 1976, related to public opinion onfinancing of abortion, but it was ultimately caused by pressure placed on members of the pro-life movement. Pro-life activists aimed to limit the impact of Roe by banning Medicaid funding, which had allowed 270,000 abortions in 1973. In this sense, public opinion was central to the pro-life strategy, as many legislators were wary of of potential opposition if Roe were overturned. . The pro-life movement then targeted funding for the abortion ban, which was supported by 55% of people in 1976 and seen as an effective means of limiting Roe's impact while attracting congressional support. Despite this, activists played a critical role in securing the bill's passage. After the defeat of the Roncallo amendment in 1974, Craig highlights how activists used voter data to pressure members for future success, illustrated by consistent votes banning abortion funding from 1976 to 1989. Evidence of this activity is encapsulated in Robert Giamo's reflection that "I know the big lobby and the pressure on members", illustrated in particular by the work of Mark Gallagher. A lobbyist for the NCHLA, Gallagher was present at the committee stage of the amendment, reportedly "telling 11th House congressmen whether the proposal is acceptable to the bishops with any compromise offered." Significantly, eight of these participants were Catholic, influenced by the strong involvement and substantial funding provided by the Church to the pro-life movement. Thus, not only was the pro-life movement significantly active in legislative proceedings, but the resources and intensity committed to these activities ensured that they had an influence, limiting access to abortion through the Hyde Amendment. The failure of anti-abortion legislation in Congress resulted primarily from growing divisions within the pro-life movement, resulting from disagreements over the wording and emphasis of the amendments. Garrow uses the example of a series of constitutional amendments proposed in March 1974. The amendments were outright rejected, reflecting the difficulties involved in amending the constitution and thus changing Supreme Court decisions, but the episode also highlights the serious disunity within within the pro-life movement. Garrow highlights how many pro-life advocates refuted these efforts, only supporting legislation that included the embryo in the Fourteenth Amendment. Their anger at more moderate proposals has contributed to the disintegration of interest groups, weakening any attempt to introduce change. Indeed, Robert Lynch, leader of the NCHLA, reflected on how “there are six pro-life organizations, each with a different amendment and plan, and each refusing to work together.” Durham illustrates how these problems were further exasperated in the 1980s by the emergence of more violent groups, namely Operation Rescue, who further divided the movement through their destructive tactics. Evidently, interest group fragmentation has undermined legislative policy efforts, yet some activists have continued to pursue this strategy, only to be limited by the presidential veto. For example, in 1990 Bush vetoed enactment bills that sought to restore funding to poor women in Colombia who became pregnant as a result of rape/incest. Consequently, Congress's interaction with other branches must also be responsible for the failure of anti-abortion legislation, struggling to overcome Supreme Court decisions and meeting resistance fromof the Executive when the majority is reached. The absence of an abortion policy within Congress also stemmed from electoral considerations on the part of its members, seeking to appease key activist groups within the states. Throughout the 1970s, members of Congress often sent abortion policy back to the Supreme Court, worried that any decision would anger activists and lead to their removal. Wilson describes how Senator Clark's defeat in Iowa in 1978 was engineered by anti-abortion forces, who destroyed his majority in Catholic neighborhoods through campaigns and leaflet distribution. Since only 1-2% of the population rates abortion as an important issue, politicians' deference to and alignment with activist groups reaffirms the formulation of abortion policies as indicative of the views of activists rather than the public in question. general. Indeed, the growing prominence of abortion in the 1980s was subverted by polarization within political circles and activist groups, deflecting the influence of more complex public opinion. Polarization has produced different impacts on members of Congress, depending on the most dominant view within their state. For example, in two gubernatorial elections in Virginia and New Jersey in 1989, pro-choice Democrats, Wilder and Florio, gained a significant advantage from their positions. However, Bob Packwood and Bob Casey, senators who contradicted their party's lines on abortion, remained elected consistently. What is clear from these examples is that abortion attitudes took precedence over party affiliation when voting for candidates. Furthermore, it is clear that members' attitudes towards the issue rarely change. Indeed, Adams' study uses congressional roll calls to show that most legislators consistently voted in favor of abortion 90 percent of the time. As a result, changing attitudes toward abortion in Congress comes not through a change in opinions, but a change in membership, as activists compete to protect their supporters and remove opponents from office. Abortion politics entered presidential politics after Roe, but Ford and Carter rode the abortion debate to maximize support from a divided and disinterested public. Ford supported states' rights on abortion in the 1976 election, but this position was vague and appeared contradictory, since he had previously vetoed the Hyde Amendment while president, defending himself under the "fiscal integrity issue." Carter was similarly vague in a basic statement of opposition to abortion, illustrating how both parties had hoped to avoid the abortion issue until anti-abortionist Ellen McCormack's single-issue campaign necessitated a takeover position. Carter and Ford were responsive to activism, likely adopting an anti-abortion stance to appease activists and limit the number of lost votes. AS president, Carter took minimal action related to abortion, avoiding debates on the Hyde Amendment and selecting advisers with a mix of attitudes—for example, pro-choice Midge Constanza as senior aide and pro-life Joseph Califano as secretary HEW. Indeed, Craig demonstrates how Carter lacked presidential leadership on abortion, stating his personal opposition to abortion, but a presidential duty to uphold the law as it stands in 1980. Ultimately, this ambivalence toward abortion reflects the broader lack of importance of the issueamong the general public. . Only 1% of people put abortion among their top three election issues, while fewer than half were knowledgeable about Roe in 1975. Abortion politics had not yet polarized, leaving presidents more focused on appeal to the general public, while doing the minimum to appease activists, thus precipitating Ford and Carter into a preference for rhetoric over politics. Reagan was the first president to take a definitive position on abortion, but it appears that this approach, at least in part, came from pro-life advocates within society. Garrow questions Reagan's anti-abortion stance, referring to his previous support of the Beilenson bill in 1967 while governor of California, allowing "therapeutic" abortions for women. However, Garrow overlooks the fact that Reagan soon afterward expressed regret over the bill's passage, stating that the life-and-death debate "should be resolved in favor of life." Despite this, Reagan's anti-abortion stance in the 1980 election was at least partly the result of a political calculation; O'Connor demonstrates how both parties were becoming increasingly distinct on abortion, reflected in pro-life involvement in the Republican Party. The rise of the religious right, particularly through the Moral Majority, has mobilized broad support and devoted considerable resources to Republicans, essentially making it necessary for candidates to take a pro-life position. Furthermore, the issue had become more important by 1980; 17% of people ranked abortion in their top three most important issues, highlighting the growth of activist movements within society and that the compromise rhetoric of Ford and Carter would be ineffective. In this sense, political and activist circles were becoming increasingly polarized in their views of abortion, shifting influence on political candidates from the general to the activist public. Although Reagan did not achieve his ambitious goals, Reagan's limited abortion policy stemmed more from the limits on abortion his power imposed by Congress and activist public opinion rather than a firm anti-abortion stance. Graber claimed that Reagan was only active in making statements on abortion, criticizing his failure to fulfill his anti-abortion agenda. However, Sundquist notes how legislative attempts to introduce abortion policy have suffered because of conflicts over New Right social and moral measures that have divided the Republican Party. Republicans, such as Olympia Snowe and Claudine Schneider, opposed Reagan's conservative social agenda, so much so that Schneider opposed the president's position 75 percent of the time. When you consider the fact that more than 80% of Democrats voted pro-choice, it is not surprising that legislative attempts to reverse abortion laws have failed. Instead, Reagan sought change through the Supreme Court, seeking to fill the federal bench with judges who "believed in law and order and a strict interpretation of the Constitution." Reagan used the selection process as an "ideological litmus test" to choose judges who were social conservatives, committed to overturning Roe. Graber's criticisms of Reagan's disappointing appointments to the Court, however, must be refuted, as his decisions were largely influenced by activist groups and the Senate. In the case of the nomination of Ronald Bork, an intransigent anti-abortionist, 52% of people disagreed with the nomination, but Garrow highlights the preponderant influence of activist protests during his tenure. confirmation hearings, combined with thework done by senators in analyzing his curriculum and philosophy. Furthermore, the Senate at the time was strongly pro-choice, thus making the nomination's failure understandable; had he succeeded, Roe would almost certainly have been overturned. Such evidence therefore reiterates the influence of Congress on the president in determining abortion policy, limiting his legislative and judicial agenda, concurrent with the consistent mobilization of activist groups to oppose actions with which they disagree. Meanwhile, George Bush's abortion policy was significantly dictated by pro-life supporters and conservative voters within society. In the 1988 election, Bush gave up his previous moderate views and shifted to an anti-abortion position, as Republican candidates needed to be acceptable to the pro-life movement. In a 1987 Conservative Digest poll, only 9 percent of respondents chose Bush as their preferred Republican candidate. Aware of this lack of support, Bush aligned himself with pro-life forces, making Dan Quayle his running mate, a young conservative with strong anti-abortion views. Bush's alignment with pro-life forces guaranteed votes in the election, as the 30% of voters who ranked abortion among their top three issues overwhelmingly voted for Bush, suggesting that pro-life activists life have been more intense and influential in determining policy than pro-choice groups. . Similar to Reagan, Bush's agenda was more limited in its application during his presidency, suffering the same problems when appointing judges. Rosen points out how David Souter's nomination was based primarily on his lack of a paper trail, using Souter's vague and moderate beliefs to gain approval from the pro-choice Senate. Likewise, with a Democratic-dominated House, political developments were ultimately limited, as abortion-related legislation was rejected by its members or vetoed by Bush. As a result, Bush's limited policy achievements were partly due to his unwavering pro-life commitment, but they were also the result of interaction with other branches of government. Please note: this is just an example. Get a custom paper from our expert writers now To conclude, general public opinion had less of an effect on abortion policy from 1965 to 1992, influenced to a greater extent by activist groups. While initially influential on presidents, polarization within politics and activist groups defined parties around a particular position. Greater involvement of activist groups put pressure on decision-making, but this was ultimately limited by checks on presidential power by Congress and the pro-choice opposition. Likewise, Congress has introduced minimal abortion policy, initially due to electoral considerations, but more recently due to increased polarization among members and divisions within the pro-life movement. The Supreme Court has shown a vulnerability to the actions of activist groups, however, it is evident, more explicitly since Webster, that the Court's rulings are determined primarily by who sits on the bench and their judicial philosophies. The evidence presented reflects the theoretical basis initially outlined that the influence of public opinion decreases with reduced issue salience and increased interest group involvement. What is also evident from the development of abortion policy is the interaction between the three branches of government, especially the.