In this new era where, to create competitive advantage, various companies invest a significant portion of their capital in intangible assets (Goldfigure, 1997) such as technology- and science-oriented companies. Investments in intangible assets, for example patents and human resources, differ from investments in tangible assets in several aspects related to information asymmetry (Abuja et al, 2005). First, many intangible assets are unique to each company (Aboody and Lev, 2000), such as branding, which does not share common characteristics not only between industries but also between companies in the same industry. Considering that companies operating in the tangible assets sector share various common characteristics among companies, for example, the change in the interest rate will systematically affect all real estate companies operating in a certain geographical region. Furthermore, future benefits and the lengths of time over which the benefits of intangible assets will last vary from company to company (Bublitz and Ettredge, 1989). As a result, investors cannot perceive the value and growth of a company's intangible assets by looking at the assets of other companies. For example, knowing the brand value of the General Motor company, we cannot infer that the brand value of the Ford Motor company, even though both companies operate in a similar environment. Second, there are no organized markets in which intangible assets are traded like tangible assets. In the absence of organized markets, investors cannot even use widely accepted asset pricing models to infer the value of intangible assets (Lev, 2001). Finally, financial statements are widely used by the investment community to determine the fair value of stocks. However, most intangible assets are not reported on the balance sheet but expensed in income. , then it can be expected that it would sell more shares in the open market to diversify its holdings. Jin and Kothari (2008) suggest that CEO stock sales are positively related to the cost of diversification. Furthermore, Ofek and Yermack (2000) argue that boards reward higher stock-based compensation to increase managers' ownership, but managers sell a portion of stock holdings on the open market to diversify and eliminate unsystematic risk from their portfolio personal because the risk for managers is greater than for ordinary investors since the human capital of managers already has a high correlation with the performance of the company. Therefore, the increased use of stock-based compensation plans can be expected to lead to an increase in the amount of stock sold by executives, ceteris paribus.