Introduction In the late 1990s, the Irish economy was booming, the unemployment rate had fallen to around 4% and productivity was continually growing. However, starting in 2002, the nature of the boom began to alternate. Work production was no longer increasing, inflation was excessive and the progression of gross domestic product (GDP) was increasingly linked to the real estate market. In 2006, although public finances still looked solid, this was misleading; the Irish economy was heavily dependent on the property boom. Covered banks accounted for more than 65% of the overall growth in property-related lending in Ireland (including 100% mortgages and tracker mortgages) and the glut of lending to developers in Ireland, further highlighting the greed of bankers. First, the main reason for the systematic failure, according to the report, was the expansion of the bank-financed real estate bubble. Between 2002 and 2008 bankers demonstrated high levels of greed combined with disregard for risk and gross errors of judgment that few bankers could disagree with. This was evident from the increase in lending across sectors, which was very uneven. Residential mortgage lending and construction and real estate lending significantly outpaced the growth of all other sectors combined (see Fig. 15). For example, loans to this sector have increased at an annual rate of almost 45%. This effectively created a property bubble which, like all bubbles, burst, heavily influencing the Irish financial crisis. This, linked to the global economic crisis, has significantly increased the pace of the crisis. With the introduction of the Eurozone, Anglo and INBS were able to compete in the Irish market. Unfortunately, this has led to willing work... half the paper... banks and other financial institutions would also be required to have a reporting system. If these reports contain all the information necessary to predict a future crisis or imprudent behavior by banks, then a procedure can be put in place to guide banks towards the appropriate approach. In conclusion, we believe that the recommendation we have suggested in this report constitutes an adequate basis for building a sustainable and prudent financial system in this country. This will facilitate the financial sector both to emerge from the crisis and to avoid in the future, as much as possible, the scale of the current problems. As the report suggests, each of us has contributed in a tiny way to this crisis, we believe that it is up to each of us to contribute to the overall recovery of this financial crisis and the recovery of the nation at large..